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Abstract 
 
Autonomous systems must respond to large amounts 
of streaming information. They also must comply with 
critical properties to maintain behavior guarantees. 
Compliance is especially important when a system self-
adapts to perform a repair, improve performance, or 
modify decisions. There remain significant challenges 
assessing the risk of adaptations that are dynamically 
configured at runtime with respect to critical property 
compliance. Assuming compliance verification was 
performed for the originally deployed system, the proof 
process holds valuable meta-data about the variables 
and conditions that impact reusing the proof on the 
adapted system. We express this meta-data as a 
verification workflow using Colored Petri Nets. As 
dynamic adaptations are configured, the Petri Nets 
produce alert tokens suggesting the potential proof 
reuse impact of an adaptation. Alert tokens hold risk 
values for use in a utility function to determine the least 
risky adaptations. We illustrate the modeling and risk 
assessment using a case study.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As autonomous systems proliferate in all domains of 
use, they must become more self-adaptive to hone their 
decision-making performance and accuracy while 
accepting continuous data inputs. Self-adaptation 
requires a methodology to configure adaptive plans that 
can produce the desired changes. The MAPE-K loop 
(Monitor-Analyze-Plan-Execute with Knowledge) has 
been proffered as the standard for self-adaptation of 
autonomic processes [10], and therefore, has been 
extensively studied [2, 4, 5, 7]. There remain significant 
challenges in the risk assessment of adaptations that are 
configured dynamically at runtime during the planning 
portion of the MAPE-K loop with respect to the 
system’s safety and security properties. Such properties 
are targeted for compliance guarantees by the deployed 
system and, if critical, are formally verified or certified. 
The difficulties of risk assessment are inversely related 
to the amount of pre-knowledge the autonomous system 
has of the adaptations it can perform. When arbitrary or 
unanticipated adaptations are possible at runtime, 
assessing the risk of compliance of the adaptations with 
critical properties becomes quite challenging. 
If adaptive plans are configured at runtime with 
minimal restrictions on what changes are allowed, then 
they will not have been vetted during the design of the 
system. In this paper, we examine a risk-based 
evaluation strategy to compare adaptive plans 
configured by a self-adaptive system. The assumption is 
that there is little prior knowledge of the overall effect 
the adaptive plans will have on the system execution. 
The risk strategy focuses on the likelihood that the 
changes caused by the adaptive plan will affect the 
reusability of the original requirement compliance 
verification processes, such as formal proofs or 
validation and certification methods. In contrast to 
runtime verification, our approach abstracts and models 
artifacts of verification processes, such as the state 
variables, conditions, and dependencies that are used to 
prove requirements compliance prior to deployment. 
The premise is that the stronger the restriction on 
verification process reuse, the higher the likelihood that 
the adaptive plan will cause a requirement violation.  
By transitioning the runtime reverification burden of 
the adaptive system to determining the risk of 
verification process reuse, runtime risk assessment 
becomes an option for a broad set of possible 
adaptations. In addition, when human analysis of the 
autonomous system is performed, the impact of adaptive 
plans on reverification or recertification is immediately 
known, along with where the impact occurred in the 
code.  
In this paper, we focus on assessing the risk of 
verification process reuse given a requirement and its 
compliance proof. The risk is represented using 
probability estimates, from which we compute the 
expected utility of each adaptive plan with respect to 
verification process reuse to identify the least risky self-
adaptation. Probability estimates are calculated based 
on verification concerns elevated from the original 
proof process, along with their impact on the proofs and 
knowledge supplied by the MAPE-K planner. We 
illustrate the utility calculations using a case study. 
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2. Background  
 
Self-adaptive systems have proliferated and 
improved over the past decades, but verification and 
certification of the adaptive properties remains a 
challenge. Villegas, et al. [20] survey self-adaptive 
systems and adaptation properties derived from control 
theory. The framework proposed evaluates self-adaptive 
systems, where adaptation properties are specified 
explicitly and driven by quality attributes. Aspects of the 
framework include dimensions to classify systems, 
adaptation properties, mappings between adaptation 
properties and quality attributes, and a set of quality 
metrics to evaluate the adaptation properties. The 
framework provides an approach to measure adaptation 
properties and then classify them according to where 
and how their properties are observed.  
The FeatUre-oriented Self-adaptatION (FUSION) 
framework proposes to measure the impact of 
adaptation design [8]. This approach evaluates the 
quality of an adaptive plan by learning the impact of 
adaptation decisions on the system’s goals. The 
framework performs fine-tuning of the adaptation logic 
to unanticipated conditions, reducing the upfront effort 
required for building such systems and making the run-
time analysis more efficient. FUSION learns and adapts 
in terms of features and can learn runtime behavior 
which is not considered at design time, but it does not 
verify that an adaptive plan complies with expected 
behavior.  
A risk-based adaptive security framework is 
proposed in [1] for IoT in eHealth, which can estimate 
and predict risk damages and future benefits using game 
theory and context-awareness techniques. The 
framework consists of an adaptive risk management 
model, an adaptive monitoring model, analytics and 
predictive models, adaptive decision-making models, 
and evaluation and validation models. The adaptive risk 
management (ARM) model coordinates the adaptive 
monitoring, analytics and predictive models, adaptive 
decision-making models, and evaluation and validation 
models into a continuous cycle. ARM can learn, adapt, 
prevent, identify, and respond to known and unknown 
security threats in real-time and can develop risk-based 
adaptive security mechanisms. However, the 
demonstration of the technology appears to currently be 
limited to minor threats and changes. 
In [19], a runtime verification framework is 
proposed for evaluating and validating self-adaptive 
behavior to guarantee compliance with security 
properties. The framework integrates runtime 
verification enablers into the feedback adaptation loop 
of the ASSET adaptive security framework. The 
framework needs four enablers: models at runtime, 
requirements at runtime, dynamic context monitoring, 
and a runtime verification. The claim is that these 
enablers allow for runtime verification of the outputs 
from feedback control loops for the validation of 
adaptive plans before instrumenting them, and include 
relevant mechanisms to keep track of the validation 
aspects. The resulting construct and integrated use of the 
enablers is not well-defined nor demonstrated. 
Integrated model-based development and formal 
verification for self-adaptive systems could prove to be 
a more effective approach to verify an adaptive plan, but 
would still require a mechanism to compare plans 
should none be completely verifiable. In [18], an 
approach is described for an automatic slicing technique 
of models with respect to the properties to be verified. 
The modeling concepts incorporate a formal semantics 
and create an intermediate modeling layer on which to 
describe the system properties. This intermediate layer 
is then “sliced” to reduce the size of the models so that 
automatic verification can be applied. The models are 
then composed, retaining their verification status, to the 
original and more complex system models.   
 
3. Creating Verification Workflows  
 
Critical requirements, especially those that relate to 
the system architecture and expected operating 
environment, would be targeted for formal verification, 
including proof and model checking, or certification 
with some level of risk to ensure the safety and security 
of the system prior to its deployment. We use the term 
verification process to encompass the various strategies 
used to determine the system’s compliance with critical 
requirements. When an autonomous system self-adapts 
by inserting new functionality, modifying functionality, 
or modifying state variables, the resulting change, called 
the adaptive plan, should fall within a risk tolerance 
threshold for compliance with critical requirements or 
provide notifications as to the extent and risk of 
compliance failure. 
Performing runtime reverification or recertification 
of information system compliance in order to deploy an 
adaptive plan is not currently a viable solution due to the 
problems with those techniques [3,15]. Our approach 
seeks to determine the probability of reusing the original 
verification processes on the adapted system, such as the 
proof, validation, and/or certification processes, that 
were originally performed (and documented) to 
guarantee requirements’ compliance. The premise is 
that a low probability of verification process reuse 
corresponds to a greater likelihood of a requirement 
violation. Verification process reuse can be inhibited if 
a state, condition, and/or control flow relied on by the 
original verification process has been altered by the 
adaptation. Thus, if multiple, comparable, adaptive 
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plans can be dynamically configured, the best plan to 
emerge would be the one with the highest probability of 
verification process reuse and, thus, a greater likelihood 
of compliance. 
In this section, we formulate a verification workflow 
(VFlow) as the model of a verification process using a 
Colored Petri Net (CPN). The CPN provides input to a 
utility function (discussed in Section 4) that determines 
the risk of deploying an adaptive plan based on 
assessing the plan for verification process reuse. A 
VFlow is constructed for each requirement that has an 
associated verification process.  
 
3.1. Verification Concerns 
 
We derive verification concerns from meta-data 
associated with the verification process for each critical 
requirement. This meta-data indicates state variables, 
conditions, functions, methods, and components that 
play a role in the original verification process. 
Verification concerns may be derived from component 
interfaces (provides/requires) [9], the pre- and 
postconditions of Hoare triples to express safety and 
progress requirements [11], and state variables within 
test scenarios, such as those used for security control 
implementation and assessment [16]. 
As a simple example, a requirement may be 
expressed as a safety or progress property. One type of 
safety property is an invariant. To prove that properties 
A and B are invariant, as written in Linear Temporal 
Logic (LTL) [14] below, 
□ (A ∧ B) 
it must be the case that the properties expressed by A 
and B hold in all reachable states. That can be restated 
in terms of Hoare triples, as many researchers use to 
express proofs and the potential for proof reuse [6].  
[∀s ∈ F | { A ∧ B } s { A ∧ B }] 
means that for all statements s in program F, A and B 
must be preserved by the execution of s. This 
immediately makes A and B verification concerns. 
Sometimes, other state variables may affect A or B, 
either by being embedded into a condition that may 
cause them to be false or by having a side effect that can 
impact their state change. Assume that during the 
verification process, it is determined that  
C ⇒ A 
Then the state of C may impact the state of A. Thus, C 
becomes a verification concern.  
Progress property proofs can follow a similar 
verification process to safety property proofs, except 
that progress properties, as temporal properties, cross 
states and, therefore, dependencies must be captured 
that exist between verification concerns. For example, 
the following progress property written in LTL,  
□ (D ⇒ ○(D ∧ K)) 
means that if D becomes true in some state, then in the 
next state (D ∧ K) will be true. This property can be 
stated in terms of Hoare triples, such as  
[∀s ∈ F | { D } s { D ∧ K }]  
which clarifies that in a state when D holds, the next 
state will have D and K both true, since all statements 
must ensure this is the case.  
With progress properties, the verification concerns 
still reflect the conditions expressed in the Hoare triples, 
making both D and K verification concerns. Other 
properties may need to hold to ensure that none of the 
statements that can execute inhibit K from being true or 
change D to false in the next state after D becomes true, 
establishing a dependency between the states. These 
properties are expressed as lemmas with their own 
proofs that may produce additional verification 
concerns. Often functions are assumed to be atomic, 
meaning they cannot be interrupted. Thus, a statement 
in F may be a function G. When proving a property, it 
may be necessary to examine the functions that G 
comprises resulting in an examination of intermediate 
(internal) state changes. For example, assume that G = 
(g  ° f) and the following statements for f and g can be 
proven.  
[∀t ∈ f | { D } t { J }] 
[∀w ∈ g | { J } w { D ∧ K }] 
Since the next complete state change occurs after G, the 
progress property is not violated. But if an adaptive plan 
did not abide by the atomicity assumptions, then the 
intermediate state transition could be problematic. 
Therefore, properties, such as J above, are also captured 
as verification concerns. In the case study described in 
Section 5, we have proven the requirements against Java 
code and extracted the verification concerns from those 
proofs, as detailed in [11]. 
 
3.2. Organizing the Verification Workflow 
 
Each verified requirement has a related VFlow that 
models the verification process using the following 
information: 
• Verification concerns as derived from the 
verification process.  
• Where, in the system architecture, the verification 
concerns were of interest, which may involve 
multiple components and functions. 
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• Conditions related to the impact or prominence of 
verification concerns in the verification process. 
These conditions describe change types or ranges 
that fall in one of three sets related to expected 
impact: devastating, worrisome, or unconcerned.  
The system architecture, as part of the VFlow 
construction, underlies the verification process and self-
adaptive system [17]. Components are generally 
examined independently for compliance and, then, as 
part of the larger system architecture through their 
interfaces. Within the components are the state 
variables, functions, and dependencies that the 
verification process must also examine, in the form of 
lemma proofs [11]. Thus, the VFlow should represent 
the proper granularity of the architecture description 
that best fits the verification process perspective and 
flow. 
 
3.3. Constructing the Colored Petri Net 
 
A Petri Net is a bipartite graph that makes available 
mathematical analyses and decision processes to a wide 
range of applications by allowing the expression of 
system functionalities and architectures.  Colored Petri 
Nets (CPNs) introduce additional functionality through 
distinguishing features among tokens traversing the 
network and complex processing by the transitions that 
dictate token paths. CPNs have been successfully 
applied to modeling scenarios in such areas as 
distributed decision making, attack modeling, access 
control policies, web service composition, process 
control, and the software development process [12, 13]. 
Reachability, conflict detection, deadlock detection, and 
quality of service are a few of the major properties that 
CPNs can assess. Their flexibility in modeling 
architectures and component processing, along with the 
availability of automated tools to simulate them, make 
them an appropriate representation for VFlows used to 
assess the risk of an adaptive plan. 
The current representation of a VFlow models the 
major components important to the verification 
processes as places in the CPN. A generic VFlow is 
shown in Figure 1. Tokens traverse the places using 
transitions. In a CPN, transitions can perform complex 
processing based on embedded, immutable data 
structures. 
 
 
Figure 1. Generic VFlow represented as a CPN 
There are three token colors used in the VFlow. Pink 
tokens hold the adaptive plan’s change set. The planning 
portion of the MAPE-K loop formulates and configures 
potential plans to be risk-assessed. The assumption is 
that the change sets embody information related to (1) 
what parameters are changed, (2) how, in general, they 
are changed, (3) what major components are affected, 
and (4) what the planner believes the impact of that 
change to be overall. The change impact can be 
determined by the planner based on accumulated 
knowledge through techniques such as reasoning over 
the success or failure history of changes, machine 
learning outcomes based on adaptive plans shared 
across related information systems, and partial plan 
simulations. More details on the calculation of the 
change impact are given in Sections 4 and 5. The 
structure of the pink token appears below where each 
element of the change set has a unique ID, the 
verification concern affected (VC), the type of effect to 
the verification concern (condition), and its planner-
calculated change impact (?̂?). 
tpink = ((ID1,  VC1,  condition1, ?̂?1), …,  
          (IDn,  VCn,  conditionn, ?̂?n)) 
The blue token traverses the CPN looking for 
verification concerns in the verification process that 
may be affected by the change set. These are called 
conflicts. This token holds the outcomes from affected 
verification concerns as well as change sets provided by 
pink tokens. Thus, checks against verification concerns 
can be performed at all places in the CPN, regardless of 
where the pink token designates the change will occur. 
As seen below, the blue token tracks the places traversed 
(visited) so that it ensures that every verification 
concern in the change set is examined at every place. 
The tracking also determines when the blue token’s 
cycle is complete and it can be absorbed to terminate the 
CPN.  
  tblue = (visited, vcMatches, vcConflicts, 
               dependencies,  conflictCount,  tokenCount) 
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The set vcMatches in the blue token accumulates the 
conflicts found as a set of tuples of the form (IDconflict, 
vcInfo, conflictPlace, ?̂?). IDconflict is a unique identifier 
of the conflict based on the blue token’s conflictCount. 
This identifier is used for the alert and may be repeated 
across alerts if more than one place is affected. vcInfo 
holds a record of the verification concern affected and 
the impact determined by the transition based on the 
change set’s condition for that verification concern. 
Thus, vcInfo embodies the VFlow’s impact indicator 
which may be different from the change set’s impact 
indicator, ?̂?. The conflictPlace is where the conflict was 
found. Each conflict in vcMatches will be at a unique 
place because a verification concern can only appear 
once at a place. If any change to a verification concern 
can strongly impact the risk of reusing the verification 
process for the requirement, it will be reflected in the 
impact indicator in vcInfo.  
The set vcConflicts in the blue token holds the pink 
token’s information for comparison with information at 
each place in the VFlow as the blue token traverses the 
CPN. As discussed in Section 3.1, progress properties 
embody dependencies among state variables. These are 
captured in the blue token’s dependencies set, which 
allows the blue token to manage the dependencies by 
enforcing a check on the impact of a verification 
concern at a place before or after a conflict was already 
found with its dependent verification concern. The 
conflictCount generates the unique ID for each pink 
token information, while the tokenCount generates a 
unique ID per red token.  
Red tokens are output by transitions to represent 
alerts. These alerts indicate potential conflicts between 
the adaptation’s change set and the requirement’s 
original verification process. The structure of a red 
token is as follows. 
tred = (ID, IDconflict, vcInfo, ?̂?, conflictPlace, placeStatus) 
The red token ID and IDconflict are assigned by the 
blue token prior to the red token being sent to the end 
state. The red token must hold all of the factors needed 
for the risk assessment of the adaptive plan for that 
VFlow. The set vcInfo contains tuples of the form (VC, 
vcImpact), so that the transitions’ impact factor based 
on the pink token’s change set condition is recorded. 
The pink token’s ?̂? value is also maintained in the red 
token along with the place where the conflict occurred 
and the weight of that place’s importance to the 
verification process. 
An example transition appears as pseudo code 
below. This is one of 18 transition rules used in a VFlow 
based on our modeling of verification processes for 
safety and progress properties. Transitions always 
require a blue token and a pink token as input. In this 
example, the blue token, B, has not visited the input 
place to the transition. The transition, T, does not have 
a verification concern (VC) that conflicts with what the 
blue token has accumulated in B.vcConflicts. The 
transition does have a conflict with a VC in the pink 
token P’s change set. 
Transition Conditions: 
    T.place_name is not in B.visited  
    No VC in T.vcInfo appears in B.vcConflicts 
    A VC in P conflicts with a VC in T.vcInfo 
Transition Actions: 
     FORALL VC in T.vcInfo that appear in P  
                    Increase B.count and B.IDconflict 
                    Create a red token, R, with B.count as its ID, 
                          B.IDconflict as its IDconflict, and other  
                          information held by P and T 
                    Update B.vcMatches to include IDconflict and  
                          the appropriate information held by T  
                          for all matching VCs 
                    Add the appropriate change information  
                          from P to B.vcConflicts using  
                          B.count for IDconflict 
           FORALL VC in P that are not in T.vcInfo 
                             Increase B.count and B. IDconflict 
              Add the appropriate change information from P 
                       to B.vcConflicts using B.count for  
                       IDconflict  
             Add T.placeName to B.visited 
             Send B to output place 
             Send P to its place of origin 
             Send all red tokens to end place 
 
4. Evaluating Risk  
 
For each requirement 𝑟 and adaptation plan 𝑎, the 
VFlow outputs a set of red tokens 𝑇(𝑟, 𝑎) representing 
alerts. Once the red tokens are generated, the system 
calculates a metric that can be used to compare the risks 
of adaptation plans based on the token information. To 
obtain a workable formula, we assume that each red 
token, independently of all other tokens, has the 
potential to represent an actual violation of verification 
process reuse. That is, the adaptive plan has altered 
something that was relied on by the original proof of the 
requirement. We also assume that verification process 
reuse is violated if and only if there is at least one red 
token representing an actual impact. (Our current work 
ignores the possibility that a group of red tokens might 
represent the violation in combination, without doing so 
individually.) For each red token 𝑡, let 𝑆(𝑡) be an 
indicator variable with value 0 if 𝑡 represents an actual 
violation and 1 otherwise. For each requirement 𝑟 and 
adaptation plan 𝑎, let 𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) be an indicator with value 
0 if 𝑎 violates the reuse of 𝑟’s proof and 1 otherwise. 
Although the values of 𝑆(𝑡) and 𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) would typically 
be deterministic, we assume they are infeasible to 
compute, and therefore model 𝑆(𝑡) and 𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) as 
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random variables. Our assumptions given above 
translate to the following statements. 
 
For each requirement 𝑟 and plan 𝑎, 
 
𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) = 0 ⇔ (∃ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑟, 𝑎))(𝑆(𝑡) = 0). 
 
For each requirement 𝑟 and plan 𝑎, the random 
variables in the set 
 
⋃ {𝑆(𝑡)}
𝑡∈𝑇(𝑟,𝑎)
 
 
are mutually independent. 
From these statements, we deduce that the 
probability that plan 𝑎 does not violate the reuse of 
requirement 𝑟’s proof is 
 
𝑃(𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) = 1) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑆(𝑡) = 1)
𝑡∈𝑇(𝑟,𝑎)
. 
 
To compare adaptation plans, we define the 
requirement utility of plan 𝑎 to be the weighted sum  
 
𝑈(𝑎) = ∑ 𝑤(𝑟)𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎)
𝑟∈𝑅
 
 
where 𝑅 is the set of requirements and 𝑤(𝑟) is a 
stakeholder-supplied utility weight for the need to 
maintain system compliance with requirement 𝑟. The 
expected requirement utility is then as follows. 
 
𝐸[𝑈(𝑎)] = ∑ (𝑤(𝑟) ∏ 𝑃(𝑆(𝑡) = 1)
𝑡∈𝑇(𝑟,𝑎)
)
𝑟∈𝑅
 
 
If the expected requirement utility can be computed, 
it can be used as a metric to distinguish riskier plans 
from less risky plans. However, this goal requires an 
estimate 𝑝(𝑡) ≈ 𝑃(𝑆(𝑡) = 1) for each token 𝑡. Each red 
token contains such an estimate ?̂?(𝑡), based on whatever 
knowledge the planner may have to compute it. Since 
?̂?(𝑡) is presumed to have been computed without 
consideration of the characteristics of the original 
verification process, we wish to adjust it based on proof-
related information to get the final estimate 𝑝(𝑡). 
Our approach to computing 𝑝(𝑡) is based on the idea 
that verification concerns and architectural places can 
have differing levels of prominence or impact in a 
verification process. We assume that red tokens 
generated from a high-impact place or verification 
concern are more likely to represent actual reuse 
violations than those coming from low-impact places or 
concerns. A red token 𝑡 contains impact multipliers 
𝑀𝑃𝐿(𝑡) and 𝑀𝑉𝐶(𝑡), representing the impact of the 
architecture place and verification concern 
(respectively) from which the token was generated. 
Lower multipliers represent higher impact/risk. We 
apply these multipliers to ?̂?(𝑡) to get 𝑝(𝑡), resulting in 
an estimate that takes into account the proof 
characteristics. 
We have considered two possible ways to apply the 
multipliers: scaling the probability and scaling the odds. 
The latter allows for the possibility of multipliers greater 
than 1, which would indicate that the estimate given by 
the planner should be increased rather than decreased. 
One of the outcomes of this study is a comparison of the 
two approaches based on how well they estimate the 
relative risk of adaptations. 
With probability scaling, we have 
 
𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑀𝑃𝐿(𝑡)𝑀𝑉𝐶(𝑡)?̂?(𝑡). 
 
With odds scaling, we have 
 
 𝑝(𝑡) =
𝑜(𝑡)
1+𝑜(𝑡)
, where 𝑜(𝑡) =
𝑀𝑃𝐿(𝑡)𝑀𝑉𝐶(𝑡)𝑝(𝑡)
1−𝑝(𝑡)
.  
 
(If ?̂?(𝑡) = 1, this formula is undefined, and we instead 
use 𝑝(𝑡) = 1.) 
 
5. Case Study  
 
To evaluate our risk comparison methodology, we 
apply it to a case study that we have developed 
previously, called the Multi-Mode Traveler System 
[11]. The case study involves a system on which we 
impose multiple self-adaptive plans. As the system is 
quite simple, we can manually reason about and 
compare the risks of each adaptation. Our goal is to 
determine whether the more mechanistic utility 
comparison metric described in Section 4 can come to 
conclusions similar to those which we have derived 
manually, given the original verification processes. 
The MMTS consists of a traveler that moves in a grid 
while attempting to avoid stationary enemies distributed 
randomly on the grid. At each step, the traveler attempts 
to choose a new position and move to it. Based on the 
direction of the move, the traveler’s fuel level may 
increase, decrease, or stay the same when it reaches the 
next position. The traveler is given an upper and lower 
limit on its fuel value, and must keep the fuel within that 
threshold. More complex variants of the system employ 
mission planning and enemy avoidance. 
The MMTS base code provides an update process 
that chooses and sets the new position and fuel value. 
We identified three high-level architectural components 
that comprise the update process. The first is 
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getCurrentStatus (gCS), which reads and validates the 
state at the start of the update. The second is 
getNextPosition (gNP), which determines the set of 
valid moves and randomly chooses a move from that set. 
The third is setPosition (sP), which moves the traveler 
to the chosen position and updates its fuel level. These 
three components form the architectural places in the 
VFlow for the two of the MMTS requirements, R1 and 
R2, stated in LTL below. 
R1: □ (minFuel ≤ fuel ≤ maxFuel) 
R2: □ ((canMove ∧ position = p) ⇒ ○notAt(p)) 
For R1, the fuel level must stay within the threshold 
at all times. For R2, if the traveler can move at a given 
time step, then it must move. canMove is defined as 
validMoves ≠ ∅, where validMoves is computed 
according to the current traveler state to exclude 
positions containing enemies and moves that would lead 
to a fuel threshold violation. A random move from the 
validMoves set is chosen in each update. If the set is 
empty, the traveler stays in its current position. notAt(p) 
is defined as position ≠ p, given p represents the current 
position. For the current case study, we assume the 
stakeholder-supplied utility weights of the requirements 
are 𝑤(R1) = 0.75 and 𝑤(R2) = 1. 
In [11], we verified that the MMTS code (without 
adaptation) satisfies these requirements and derived the 
verification concerns using the process outlined in 
Section 3.1. As an outcome of the verification process, 
we extract impact multipliers for use in the risk 
comparison calculations. These multipliers are based on 
the prominence of different verification concerns and 
architectural places in requirements’ proofs, as well as 
the conditions required by the proofs. 
Table 1 shows the place impact multiplier for each 
of the 3 architectural places for each requirement. In this 
case study, we manually assigned values of 0.2 (high 
impact), 0.5 (medium impact), or 0.9 (low impact) based 
on our perception of the importance of each place in 
each proof. These values and others described in this 
section are shown in the example VFlow for R1 in 
Figure 2. 
 
Table 1. Impact multiplier for the  
VFlow place if a change occurs 
 gCS gNP sP 
R1 0.9 0.5 0.2 
R2 0.5 0.5 0.2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. VFlow for R1 with the change set from adaptation A1 
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Table 2. Verification concern impacts from the VFlow perspective for R1 
R1 devastating worrisome unconcerned 
fuel 
Change greater than or equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙, positive or 
negative. 
Change greater than or equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
2
, positive or 
negative. 
Change less than 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
2
, positive or 
negative 
minFuel 
Change greater than or equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙, positive. 
Change greater than or equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
2
, positive. 
Negative change or change 
less than 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
2
. 
maxFuel 
Change greater than or equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙, negative. 
Change greater than or equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
2
, negative. 
Positive change or change less 
than 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
2
. 
Table 3. Verification concern impacts from the VFlow perspective for R2 
R2 devastating worrisome unconcerned 
fuel Set to 0. Large change, positive or negative. 
Small change, positive or 
negative. 
minFuel Set to maxFuel. 
Increased to a value less than 
maxFuel. 
Set to 0. 
maxFuel Set to 0. 
Decreased to a value greater than 
minFuel. 
Increased. 
validMoves 
Changed to a nonempty set with no 
change in nextMove. 
Changed to a nonempty set with a 
change in nextMove. 
Set to ∅. 
nextMove 
Set to null with no change in 
validMoves. 
Set to null with a change in 
validMoves. 
Set to null with validMoves 
changed to ∅. 
position Changed with nextMove set to null. 
Maintained with nextMove set to 
null. 
Maintained when validMoves 
is empty. 
 
As discussed previously, the impact multiplier for a 
verification concern can depend on the type of change 
made. Verification concern impacts are categorized as 
devastating, worrisome, or unconcerned, and the 
corresponding impact multiplier values are 0.2, 0.5, and 
0.9, respectively. Table 2 and Table 3 show the rules that 
we used for categorizing the relevant verification 
concerns’ impacts for R1 and R2, respectively. The 
categorization is based on the type and/or magnitude of 
the change, which is supplied by the planner. 
 
5.1. Potential Adaptations 
 
In our example scenario, the MMTS is initialized 
with the traveler at position (0,0) with a fuel value of 80, 
a lower fuel threshold minFuel = 0, and an upper fuel 
threshold maxFuel = 160. The system is simulated for 
25 time steps, at which point an engine failure occurs, 
triggering the adaptation process. The planner 
configures possible adaptation plans and constructs their 
change sets to assess the risk of impacting proof reuse 
for requirements R1 and R2. 
The four adaptation plans we compare are: 
A1: maxFuel is divided by 2 within gCS. 
A2: maxFuel is reduced by 40, and minFuel is 
increased by 40 within gCS.  
A3: The next move for the traveler is not chosen for 
5 time steps within gNP, even if validMoves is 
nonempty (to simulate a stop for repair).  
A4: validMoves is changed to the empty set for 5 time 
steps (to simulate a stop for repair) in gNP. 
 
5.2. Examining Adaptation Plan Risks 
 
By manual analysis and simulation, we have 
identified the potential risks of each plan with respect to 
the requirements. A1 is risky for R1, as it leads to a 
violation if the current fuel value is greater than 80. 
When R1 fails, it also causes a failure in R2, because the 
traveler stops moving if it detects a violation of the fuel 
threshold. Therefore, A1 is also risky for R2. A2 can 
also pose a threat to R1 and R2 if the current fuel value 
is below 40 or above 120, but that is not possible given 
the function for calculating the fuel by the 25th time step 
when the adaptation occurs. Therefore, A2 has very 
little risk if performed early in the traveler movement. 
A3 and A4 both disallow movement for 5 moves, 
which poses no threat to R1. A3 is very risky for R2, and 
in fact will always cause a violation if the set of valid 
moves is nonempty at the time of the adaptation. A4 is 
superficially similar to A3, but it actually is not risky for 
R2, because R2 only requires movement when the set 
validMoves is nonempty. 
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Based on our analysis, A3 should be considered 
risky for R2, while A1 should be considered risky for 
R1 and R2. A2 might be considered marginally risky for 
R1 and R2, because it could fail under some 
circumstances, although those circumstances are not 
possible in our simulation. A4 poses no risk for either of 
the requirements. 
It remains to be shown how the planner generates the 
initial success probability estimate ?̂? for each plan’s 
pink token(s). In this case study, we assume the planner 
knows that reducing the set of valid moves is less risky, 
so it uses ?̂? = 0.99 for all of A4’s pink tokens. We 
assume the planner has been able to determine that 
changing the logic in getNextPosition has some risk to 
both requirements, so it uses ?̂? = 0.5 for A3’s pink 
tokens. 
For A1 and A2, we assumed that the planner might 
run predictive simulations involving perturbations of 
minFuel or maxFuel, to estimate the sensitivity of the 
system to such changes. We performed 200-step 
simulations in which either minFuel or maxFuel was 
perturbed at the 100th step, with 1000 runs of the 
simulation for each perturbation size and requirement. 
The simulations produced a success rate of 0.532 for R1 
when maxFuel was reduced by 80, meaning 53.2% of 
the 1000 simulations found no violation of R1. The 
corresponding success rate for R2 was 0.505. Therefore, 
we set ?̂? = 0.532 for A1’s pink token in R1’s VFlow, 
and ?̂? = 0.505 for the pink token in R2’s VFlow. 
In all simulations where minFuel was increased by 
40 or maxFuel was decreased by 40, no proof violations 
were detected. Assuming the planner would be cautious 
enough not to indicate a guaranteed success based on a 
simulation, we set ?̂? = 0.99 for all of A2’s pink tokens. 
 
5.3. Computed Results 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 show the success probabilities 
computed from the set of red tokens for each 
requirement/plan pair, along with the expected utility 
based on the probabilities and the requirements’ utility 
weights. Table 4 provides the results for the probability 
scaling approach. Table 5 shows the odds scaling 
results. 
 
Table 4. Results from probability  
scaling approach 
Results Using Probability Scaling 
 
R1 Success 
Prob. 
R2 Success 
Prob. 
Expected 
Utility 
A1 0.0127 0.00708 0.0166 
A2 0.0204 0.00630 0.0216 
A3 1 0.0500 0.800 
A4 1 0.446 1.20 
Table 5. Results from odds scaling approach 
Results Using Odds Scaling 
 
R1 Success 
Probability 
R2 Success 
Probability 
Expected 
Utility 
A1 0.0345 0.0226 0.0485 
A2 0.875 0.858 1.51 
A3 1 0.0909 0.841 
A4 1 0.978 1.73 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The risk values calculated using odds scaling match 
fairly well with what we would expect based on our 
manual reasoning. For R1, A3 and A4 were found to 
have no risk, A2 was found to have low risk (high 
success probability), and A1 was found to have high 
risk. For R2, A1 and A3 were found to have high risk, 
while A2 and A4 had low risk. However, there are some 
discrepancies from what we would expect. For example, 
the success probability computed for R2 was higher for 
A3 than for A1, even though A3 nearly always causes a 
failure for R2 while A1 causes failures less frequently. 
The same issue occurs when probability scaling is used. 
An additional problem occurs with probability scaling 
in that A2 is found to have the lowest success 
probability for R2, even though it is one of the safer 
adaptations for that requirement. 
Given these discrepancies, we plan to refine our risk 
calculations in future work. In particular, we will 
attempt to find a way to relax the assumption that all red 
tokens affect the requirements independently of each 
other. Another important future task will be to formalize 
the process of extracting meta-data from a verification 
process. Our approach thus far has relied on manual 
proofs and manual meta-data extraction. We plan to 
develop a methodology for extracting this information 
in a way that can be automated in some form. 
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